
Animal instincts and immorality
‘I
think I could turn and live with animals,
they
are so placid and self-contained,
I
stand and look at them long and long,
They
do not sweat and whine about their condition,
They
do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
They
do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
Not
one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things,
Not
one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago,
Not
one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth.’
Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass
The argument that an animal is immoral because it kills
another animal for food is what maintains human moral superiority. Many animals
have the ability to engage in intentional behaviour which requires some degree
of abstract thinking. Certain animal behaviour, such as altruism, is certainly
as equally consistent with the explanation that at least some animals engage in
evaluative or normative-type cognition as with any other competing explanation.
But the fact that an animal may be capable of abstract thought and even of some
sort of mental behaviour that may be described as evaluative or normative does
not mean that animals act ‘immorally’[i].
To say that someone has acted ‘immorally’ suggests that they have
‘intentionally’ violated a moral rule. But animals cannot intentionally
violate a moral rule any more than can a young child. In most legal systems,
there is a minimum age for criminal liability that is generally at the very
least five years old. Similarly, some adults are, for reasons of organic or
psychological impairment, similarly unable to conform their conduct to rule
standards. The fact that some humans may not be able to conform their conduct to
rule standards, or that animals cannot do so, does not mean that humans who
‘can’ choose to follow moral rules are thereby not obligated to do so. Put
simply, the fact that some animals kill other animals is absolutely irrelevant
to the matter of the obligation of those humans who can make moral decisions.
[i]
Francione, GL. (2003) Animals and
moral conduct. www.animal-law.org
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